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Using theoretical models about the interaction between monetary policy-making and wage 
bargaining institutions, some researchers had been predicting an acceleration in wage growth 
under EMU (Iversen and Soskice 1998; Iversen et al 2000; Cukierman and Lippi 2001). 
However, the empirical evidence shows that, after the formation of the monetary union, wage 
growth has remained under control or even decelerated. Of the numerous explanations 
advanced to account for this trend, the most promising seems the one proposed by Posen and 
Gould (2006), who argue that behind the generalised shift towards wage restraint is enhanced 
monetary credibility in EMU. Whilst building on a similar argument, this paper adds to it in 
important respects. First, I show that the effects of a monetary union depend on labour market 
institutions. Second, and most originally, I argue that a strategic interaction between the ECB 
and non-atomistic labour unions is possible only in the case of large countries, whose price 
behaviour can potentially affect EU-13 inflation. This leads to the main finding behind this 
paper, namely that the relationship between wage growth and economy size is hump-shaped, 
with wage restraint more present in large and small countries, and less so in countries of 
intermediate size. Differently from a large country like Germany, small economies are free 
riders with respect to the monetary regime, but they care nonetheless for cost competitiveness, 
even if to different degrees. On the other hand, intermediate countries are trapped “in-
between” because neither do they believe capable of affecting euro-zone inflation, nor do they 
look at cost competitiveness as key to their economic survival.  
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It is undeniable that wage growth has remained under control after the formation of 
EMU (European Commission, Quarterly Report on the Euro Area 2002-2007; 
Pichelmann in Buti and Sapir 2003; Posen and Gould 2006). This is in contrast to the 
predictions made by some researchers. Building on sophisticated models that study 
the strategic interaction between wage bargaining systems and monetary authorities, 
Iversen and Soskice (1998), Iversen et al (2000) and Cukierman and Lippi (2001) had 
in fact argued in favour of a decline in wage restraint in EMU. Their analyses were 
based on a standard political economy argument, according to which monopoly 
unions refrain from excessive wage settlements when they believe that their central 
bank will punish them with a monetary restriction that is due to raise unemployment 
levels. The creation of the monetary union was expected to soften or even eliminate 
this incentive considering that each labour union, even if monopolistic, would have 
been nonetheless too small to affect average price conditions in the euro-area and to 
stimulate thereby a reaction by the European Central Bank (ECB). In particular, 
Iversen and Soskice (1998) have been supporting this type of argument taking 
Germany as the key example indeed because here a strategic interaction between 
labour unions and the Bundesbank had been in place since the mid-1970s. 
Nevertheless, Germany is the country that registered the most dramatic deceleration in 
wage growth since the inception of EMU. What explains generalised wage restraint in 
EMU and the especially steep deceleration in Germany? 
 
Apart from the early theoretical formulations of the kind mentioned above, numerous 
arguments are out there that could account for the general shift towards wage 
moderation after 1999. Even so, existing approaches fail on at least three grounds.  
 
First, many of them are theoretically oversimplified. By way of example, the 
explanation for which wage restraint is induced by enhanced product market 
competition in a monetary union is largely unsophisticated. External competition does 
not always force consumers into shifting demand away from national producers in 
favour of external ones. The relative impact of product market competition on wage 
growth should in fact depend both on initial cost conditions and on the relative 
substitutability of domestic and internationally produced goods.  
 
Second, some of the available explanations lack empirical support. A typical example 
concerns the issue of the impact of enhanced product market competition on labour 
institutions. The core contention is that globalisation and the threat of relocation 
conspire to reduce the bargaining power of labour unions and, with it, their possibility 
to demand relatively high wages. However, besides some sporadic anecdotal 
evidence, there is not sufficient proof to formulate a conclusive view about the impact 
of larger external labour supply on national wage-setting behaviour (see Hirsch 1993). 
A related strand of literature revolves around the question of the impact of different 
levels of collective bargaining on wage inflation. It builds on Calmfors’ and Driffil’s 
argument about a non-monotonic relationship between the degree of coordination in 
wage bargaining and wage developments (Calmfors and Driffil 1988). In this case, the 
supporting evidence is mixed and, to some extent, problematic. On the one hand, 
there has been a trend towards de-centralization in wage bargaining since the 1980s 
not least because of the privatization of public enterprises and because of the   5
emergence of the service economy, at the same time as some European countries were 
actually opting for stronger centralization and coordination (e.g. Italy, Spain and 
Portugal). On the other hand, and more generally, testing these arguments is an 
exercise complicated by the fact that labour market institutions tend to be sticky and 
that, informally, changes may occur that are not captured by the formal indexes (e.g. 
OECD data) most commonly used to categorise countries according to the prevailing 
level of wage bargaining (see Driffil 2006).  
 
Third, and most disappointingly, most the available explanations for restraint remain 
sectoral with very little integration between labour economics, trade theory and 
monetary regime accounts.  
 
In order to address at least some of these shortcomings, this paper focuses on the 
question of the impact of the monetary regime on wage behaviour using econometric 
tools to isolate the most prominent explanations for restraint but also integrates 
monetary-economics arguments with specifications that borrow from traditional trade 
theories and from studies concerning the effects of labour market institutions on wage 
growth.  
 
The importance of the monetary-policy context for wage behaviour is undeniable. The 
ECB regards wage formation as one of the most important determinants of inflation 
(ECB Introductory Statements 1999-2007). National unions themselves are not 
immune to monetary policy-making. In one specific case, that of Germany, national 
wage bargainers go as far as assuming that their wage-setting behaviour may 
condition the central bank’s reaction function (Marzinotto 2007). Against this 
framework, it is no coincidence if IG Metall, the German metalworking union, is the 
only labour union in the euro-zone that entertains informal direct talks with the ECB. 
Given the abundant factual and anecdotal evidence on the relationship between 
European monetary policy-making and national wage formation processes, it is 
somehow puzzling that this strand of literature has received comparatively lesser 
attention than studies about the impact on wages of product market competition 
(Bertola et al 2001; OECD 2005), of labour market institutions (Soskice 1990; Visser 
and Hemerijck 1997; Rhodes in Pierson 2001; Hancké and Rhodes 2004; Driffil 2005; 
Bowdler and Nunziata 2007), and of the interaction between these two (Danthine and 
Hunt 1994). A notable exception is the paper by Posen and Gould (2006), who argue 
that wage restraint in EMU is the result of a rise in the credibility of the new single 
monetary policy. Whilst building on the argument developed by Posen and Gould, 
this paper integrates it with two specifications.  
 
Firstly, a crucial presumption is that labour unions will be capable of delivering wage 
restraint in the face of a credible non-accommodating monetary policy solely in 
countries that are characterised by a highly centralised collective bargaining system 
and/or by extensive coverage. The argument developed in the literature is that only 
large encompassing unions can internalise the externalities from monetary policy 
(Franzese 1994; Hall 1994; Iversen 1994; Iversen and Soskice 1998; Franzese and 
Hall 1998, 2000). Secondly, even where coordination is high –which is a guarantee of 
the fact that unions bargain over a “national wage”- it is not necessarily true that wage 
inflation in one country will affect inflation in the euro-zone, thereby stimulating a 
reaction by the ECB. This should happen solely in the case of large countries. Only   6
encompassing unions in large countries have an incentive to internalise the ECB’s 
reaction function. 
 
Following from the above specifications, the core contention behind this paper is that 
the incentives behind wage moderation vary from country to country depending on 
economy size. A hint at the relevance of country size in EMU is already present in 
European Commission (1998) and Cukierman and Lippi (2001). This paper is more 
specific in that it suggests that the relationship between wage growth and country size 
is non-monotonic with wage discipline relatively more evident in large and small 
countries than in countries of intermediate size. The hump-shaped relationship is 
evident from 2000 to 2005 and weakens where the sample includes EU countries that 
are not EMU members, but it does disappear in the euro-zone itself before the 
inception of EMU from 1994 to 1999.  
 
The reasons behind this awkward relationship between euro-area wage developments 
and country size are as follows. Labour unions in a large country like Germany are 
aware that their wage behaviour has the potential to affect average price conditions in 
the euro-area and, with it, the reaction function of the ECB. Marzinotto (2007) 
provides some anecdotal evidence that would confirm this reading. Hence, they opt 
for wage restraint as an interest rate hike by the ECB would constrain demand not 
only at home, but also in the other euro-area countries, thereby jeopardising the export 
performance of the large country from which the financial instability has originated
2. 
The greater a large country’s level of intra-EMU trade, the stronger the incentive for 
restraint. This is the point in which monetary policy regime accounts merge with more 
traditional trade theories. Small countries, in contrast, are free riders with respect to 
the logic of the credibility argument as they are practically unable to affect EU-13 
inflation
3. Still, there should be a tendency towards wage moderation given that cost 
competitiveness is key to the survival of small open economies, even if I expect some 
variation in wage behaviour across small countries because sensitivities to cost 
competitiveness should vary from one country to another depending on traditional 
trade ties (i.e. whether they are former core ERM countries or not) and on the 
prevailing type of industry (i.e. whether they are specialised in high-tech industry or 
not). Finally, economies of intermediate size are trapped in between as none of the 
two mechanisms described above –the demand mechanism and the competitiveness 
channel- works in full. This results into faster-than-average wage growth. 
 
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows. Section I presents theories for 
wage moderation. Section II clarifies the meaning and measurement of wage 
moderation and offers preliminary evidence on the non-linear relationship between 
wage restraint and country size that motivates our analysis. Section III describes the 
baseline model. Section IV presents the econometric model employed and discusses 
some first results. Section IV uses panel data analysis to check the robustness of the 
results obtained from the previous exercise.  
 
                                                 
2 Notwithstanding the fact that an interest rate rise may lead to an appreciation of the Euro exchange 
rate vis-à-vis other similarly credible international currencies with negative consequences also for 
exports to third countries.  
3 There is ample anecdotal evidence confirming small countries’ frustration with the impossibility to 
shape the ECB’s reaction function due to their size. Ireland is the most prominent example (The 
Telegraph 25/04/2007).   7
1. CONTENDING THEORIES OF WAGE MODERATION IN EMU 
 
 
European economic integration and the introduction of the Euro have been 
accompanied by protracted wage restraint, whether the latter is defined as just modest 
or rather negative nominal or real wage growth, and whether incorporating 
productivity developments or not. There is but little agreement over the reasons 
behind persistent wage moderation in EMU
4.  
 
The impact of product market competition on wages  
 
Traditional trade theories acknowledge that economic integration and the ensuing rise 
in product market competition (PMC) have a profound impact on labour markets. 
Accounts of the “automatic” effect of market integration on real wages are organised 
around two opposing views (Bertola et al 2001).  
 
One is set against a traditional wage-setting equation and posits that competitive 
pressures from abroad that take the form of a rise in the supply of substitute consumer 
goods compress mark-ups, reduce labour demand, thereby leading to a fall in the real 
wage. The crucial point in this dynamics is that, after market integration, domestic 
consumers have the option to shift demand away from national producers and toward 
external ones. The degree to which this is likely to happen depends upon: (i) the 
relative substitutability of domestic and internationally produced goods, as real wages 
should suffer from stronger downward pressures where the imported consumer goods 
are perfect or close-to-perfect substitutes to national ones; and (ii) the share of 
consumer goods over total imported goods. This framework of analysis focuses 
exclusively on the behaviour of private consumption in an integrated market
5. 
 
Instead, the second view describes an opposite mechanism that revolves around 
national investment and net exports rather than private consumption. This approach is 
indebted to the so-called new trade theories, for which market integration is 
economically desirable mainly because it allows for the exploitation of economies of 
scale (Krugman 1979). In other words, in the face of a larger market, national 
producers have the opportunity to increase production volumes with the result that 
economic growth will be stimulated, labour demand will increase and, with it, the 
(equilibrium) real wage (Hirsch 1993). This process is in sharp contrast to the one 
described above, not least because this second mechanism concerns investment and 
net exports but it ignores private consumption.  
 
All in all, it seems reasonable to argue that the net effect of economic competition on 
wage developments will depend upon the relative importance of the two mechanisms 
described above. One possible way of assessing the comparative significance of the 
two channels through which economic competition affects wages is by determining 
the contribution of private consumption to GDP growth relative to that of investment 
and net exports. Where the former prevails, one may well expect that product market 
competition exercises a dampening effect on wages. It is worth mentioning that most 
                                                 
4 For a snapshot of the main theories, assumptions and results, see appendix A. 
5 Please note that reference is to private consumption only. We leave public consumption out of the 
picture. The choice is warranted considering that the important variable here is consumption of tradable 
goods, whereas public administrations typically acquire non-tradable goods.   8
empirical analyses tend to support the more optimistic view on the impact of freer 
trade on labour markets. This is not only because lately investment and net exports 
have been stronger drivers of growth than private consumption, but also because 
import-competing firms across OECD countries have been employing only 4% of the 
total labour force  (OECD 2005, 23-72), which is an indication of the fact that 
internationally produced goods are hardly perfect substitutes to domestic ones. And, 
yet, modest wage growth in EMU remains puzzling.  
 
The impact of external competition on labour market institutions 
 
PMC affects wages also indirectly by impacting on labour market institutions (LMI) 
and, through those, on the nominal and real bargained wage. As concerns the effect of 
greater openness on LMI, the most common view is that unions tend to refrain from 
excessive (nominal and real) wage settlements either to preserve competitiveness –
where the latter is perceived as an insurance device against possible job losses- or 
against the threat of relocation. In one way or the other, the crucial point is that, with 
market integration and globalisation more generally, the employment costs of 
excessive wage rises have gone up. Differently from the theories evoked above, which 
address the “automatic” impact of economic integration on wages, this strand of 
literature studies how and to what extent PMC alters labour unions’ opportunity sets 
and, to follow, their bargaining strategies and outcomes. The extensive literature on 
the social pacts signed in the 1990s with the aim of preserving or enhancing 
competitiveness is predicated on these assumptions (Visser and Hemerijck 1997; 
Rhodes in Pierson 2001; Hancké and Rhodes 2004)
6.  
 
The impact of labour market institutions on wages 
 
LMI themselves, whether undergoing changes on the back of globalisation or not, 
have a bearing on compensations. Wages are in fact taken to reflect unions’ 
bargaining power. It is often explained that persistent wage moderation since the 
1980s is the consequence of declining union membership and union density, i.e. the 
share of the labour force covered by a national contract. Yet, simple arguments about 
the diminishing political power of labour unions are not always convincing not least 
because LMI are more than just union membership and density. They incorporate 
other dimensions, and in particular: centralization and coordination. 
 
Centralization and coordination refer to the level at which collective bargaining takes 
place (firm-, sectoral or national level). Insofar as they shape unions’ incentive 
structure rather than their actual political power, these two dimensions of LMI seem 
particularly appropriate in an analysis that focuses on the interaction between wage 
bargaining systems and monetary policy and that is indeed concerned with positive 
and negative incentives. The theoretical inspiration here comes from Calmfors and 
Driffil (1988), who have postulated a hump-shaped relationship between the level of 
collective bargaining and real wages (and hence employment) and suggested that 
wage restraint is greater in highly coordinated and in fully decentralized bargaining 
                                                 
6 A second valuable research avenue has looked at the impact of technological progress on wage 
behaviour, where the argument is that capital-augmenting technological progress increases job turnover 
thereby reducing unions’ bargaining power (see Hornstein et al 2002). Yet, because these dynamics 
concern the long-term, they will not be explicitly addressed in this context. I am grateful to Esther 
Perez-Ruiz for reminding me of this literature.   9
systems, but it is discouraged where collective bargaining is “in between”. The 
explanation for it is as follows. In countries where collective bargaining is 
decentralised, excessive wage settlements have immediate employment costs because 
of the high elasticity of product demand. In contrast, in coordinated wage bargaining 
systems, the monopoly union refrains from excessive wage settlements because it is 
able to internalise the (undesirable) consequences of wage militancy. As a matter of 
fact, a wage rise in one sector would lead to a similar rise in all the other sectors with 
the result that the general price level should increase leading to a fall in the real wage 
(Calmfors and Driffil 1988; see also Soskice 1990; 2000; Mares 2006). Following 
from this theoretical tradition, it is often argued that persistent wage moderation since 
the 1980s is the consequence of the move towards de-centralization and of the rising 
importance of firm-level wage contracts. 
 
It should be noted however that the empirical tests on the impact of LMI on wage 
developments have some limitations.  
 
Firstly, there is little empirical evidence to show that wage bargaining has in fact 
become local across the board. In contrast, there are numerous examples pointing to 
rising coordination in many European countries (e.g. Ireland, Italy and Spain), mostly 
attained in the framework of social pacts in the run-up to EMU and thereafter (Rhodes 
1997; Regini 1999; Campos Lima and Naumann 2000; Royo 2002; Hanckè and 
Soskice 2003). 
 
Secondly, even if there were a move towards de-centralization, it is not necessarily 
true that this should lead to wage restraint independently of the initial level of 
collective bargaining. Following from Calmfors’ and Driffil’s hump-shaped curve 
(1988), highly centralised systems that move slowly towards de-centralization will 
first go through a stage in which coordination is intermediate and thus the real 
bargained wage will go up. Instead, one should witness downward wage pressures on 
the back of de-centralization only in the case of countries that move from intermediate 
to firm-level wage bargaining. Yet, the evidence on this latter case is weak. The only 
countries that in the early 1990s show intermediate levels of wage bargaining register 
either no change in their collective bargaining systems as of 2000 (i.e. France and 
Sweden) or a move towards greater centralization (i.e. Italy and Portugal)
7.  
 
Thirdly, LMI tend to be sticky. The indexes normally used to measure centralization 
and coordination show little variation from one year to the other (OECD 2004), in 
spite of the fact that informally wage bargaining systems in Europe have undergone 
important transformations (Driffil 2005).  
 
Fourthly, different labour market indicators capture different aspects of the bargaining 
system. By way of example, coordination and coverage tend to be positively and 
significantly correlated with each other, but the former affects unions’ incentive 
structures, whereas the latter directly addresses the issue of enforceability. It is up to 
the researcher to pick the LMI indicators that best fit her research agenda. At other 
times, different dimensions of LMI (trade union membership, coverage, coordination, 
centralization, etc.) are used interchangeably or even as expressions of the same 
phenomenon despite the fact that they might indeed have opposite wage effects. The 
                                                 
7 This is based on the OECD’s centralization and coordination indexes (OECD 2004), see table 3.   10
effect of a combination of high union density and high coordination, for example, is 
ambiguous. High union density tends to raise wage militancy just because, by 
representing a large proportion of employees, labour unions have greater bargaining 
power. At the same time, however, they also cover more sectors of the economy (read 
a rise in coordination), which should lead to a decline in wage demands either because 
inflationary wage settlements will spread across the economy reducing all employees’ 
purchasing power or simply because encompassing unions tend to opt for an 
egalitarian wage policy (Kittel 2000). 
 
Some researchers have studied how the effect of LMI on wages varies along with 
changes in the macroeconomic context, and more specifically in the degree of product 
market competition. A notable example is the study by Danthine and Hunt (1994). 
The authors argue that greater international competition produces a shift in unions’ 
incentive structures in the sense that workers have no alternative but to accept 
relatively moderate wage settlements, whether collective bargaining is centralised, 
fully decentralised or intermediate. In other words, market integration flattens out 
Calmfors’ and Driffil’s hump-shaped curve (Danthine and Hunt 1994), a result that 
speaks to the literature on the impact of globalisation on LMI evoked earlier.  
 
The impact of monetary credibility on wages 
 
Better linked to the characteristics of the new EMU regime that has come into being 
as of 1999 are the so-called monetary credibility arguments. A burgeoning strand of 
literature has brought together the literature on the impact of LMI on wage growth 
and the studies on central bank independence and then built dynamic models that 
indeed explore the interaction between bargaining structures and changes in monetary 
policy (Cukierman and Lippi 1999; Coricelli et al.). Along similar lines, Iversen and 
Soskice (1998, 2000) had anticipated that the devolution of monetary sovereignty to 
the ECB was deemed to reduce the incentive for restraint as every single national 
union would have been too small in EMU to affect average price conditions with the 
result that the incentive to internalise the externalities from excessive wage 
settlements was to fade away. To be fair, these analyses were but only theoretical and 
anticipated possible dynamics in EMU.  
 
Empirical analyses on the impact of monetary credibility on wage developments 
normally revolve around inflation expectations. Wage growth in EMU is modest 
because economic agents –persuaded of the fact that the ECB’s commitment to price 
stability is a credible one- have lowered their inflation expectations and in turn their 
nominal wage demands. The EU Commission itself has often used this argument (EU 
Commission 2006, 2007). However, applied studies that build on strong theoretical 
foundations remain scarce. A notable exception is the paper by Posen and Gould 
(2006). The authors find that increases in monetary credibility with the coming into 
operation of the ECB –measured by the fall in the long government bond rate- have 
produced wage restraint in almost all OECD countries, whether they are member of 
the euro-zone or not, and in particular in those countries -Italy is a case in point- that 
did not have a history of a non-accommodating monetary policy at home before 
joining EMU.  
 
I find that these results are more promising than generic references to the rise in 
competitive pressures, which are in most cases theoretically unsophisticated, as well   11
as more persuasive than arguments concerning the changing face of industrial 
relations in EMU, which on their part lack convincing empirical evidence. Yet, the 
argument, as presented by Posen and Gould (2006), needs to be better defined.  
 
I posit, first, that this should be visible only in countries that have a centralised 
collective bargaining system or extensive coverage, as only large encompassing 
unions are capable of internalising the externalities from their behaviour (Olson 
1982). Along similar lines, Hall and Franzese (1998) confirm an interactive pattern 
with inflation falling in central banking conservatism and in bargaining coordination. 
The article by Posen and Gould contains references to labour market institutions. Yet, 
their results are ambiguous. Measures of coordination and centralization do not show 
up as significant, a condition that could be ascribed to the fact that the OECD indexes 
used in the regression do not vary significantly from one period to another. Trade 
union density becomes significant only when interacted with economy size, therewith 
indicating that in large countries a decline in labour union density is conducive to 
wage moderation (Posen and Gould 2006, 12). Nevertheless, the relevant indicator 
should be coordination in wage bargaining rather than trade union density as only the 
former conditions the incentive structure of wage-setters and is thus compatible with 
the monetary credibility theory of wage restraint
8.  
 
Secondly, in a monetary union, the crucial variable is not much the individual gain in 
monetary credibility from the previous period, but rather the relative size of an 
economy, as in fact the incentive to restrain wages in anticipation of a monetary 
reaction by the ECB should be manifest only in countries that are large enough to 
affect average wage inflation in the euro-zone, and thereby to precipitate a reaction by 
the ECB. Posen and Gould refer to country size but the issue remains more or less on 
the margins. The authors interact country size (measured by GDP levels) with trade 
union density to assess the impact of changes in LMI on wage growth whilst 
controlling for the fact that large countries may have some independence of labour 
supply (2006, 12). Yet, to support the monetary credibility argument and in line with 
the observations made above, it would have probably been necessary to interact 
country size with the change in the long government bond rate. I address this issue by 
incorporating size into my cross-sectional analysis of wage restraint, before and after 
EMU, together with other independent variables.  
 
 
2. THE HUMP-SHAPED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WAGE RESTRAINT 
AND COUNTRY SIZE  
 
 
The first step in an analysis of this kind is to find an appropriate definition for wage 
moderation. The theoretical traditions evoked in the opening of this paper refer 
interchangeably to slower nominal or real wage growth, whether incorporating 
productivity gains or not.  
 
Most of the existing analyses look at nominal and real compensations per employee 
and/or unit labour costs. These indicators allow in fact for cross-country comparisons. 
                                                 
8 In this respect, it would have been interesting to see whether the gain in monetary credibility 
interacted with the coordination indicator showed up as significant since one would expect enhanced 
monetary credibility to lead to wage moderation in rising coordination levels.   12
Nevertheless, in the present research context, and similarly to Posen and Gould 
(2006), I have decided to look at total wage growth in an economy, as this is the only 
aggregate the ECB shows sensitive to. There is in fact extensive qualitative evidence 
confirming that the ECB is extremely responsive to yearly or even monthly total wage 
growth (ECB 2007a, 2007b, 2007c).  
 
To start, I consider both nominal and real compensations of employees in each EU 
country. The former are expressed in billions Euro (purchasing power parity). The 
latter are derived by depurating nominal compensations using an index for the price 
deflator of final demand. The decision to focus on the price deflator as opposed to the 
most commonly used GDP deflator derives from the fact that the latter can be 
misleading as it overstates price changes that result from improved terms of trade 
(Kohli 2004). Furthermore, to account for the fact that total wages in one country may 
increase just because the number of people in employment has gone up, I subtract 
employment creation from the rate of wage growth
9. Because wage settlements have 
an inflationary potential when they grow above productivity, I also deduct 
productivity growth. This is total factor productivity for the whole economy in each 
country as opposed to mere labour productivity given the typical mechanism of rent-
sharing between employers and employees. Moreover, this variable is measured in the 
previous year to account for the fact that wage-setters tend to recognise gains in 
productivity only with a lag (Blanchard and Philippon 2003). All the figures are the 
author’s calculations and are based on the EU Commission’s AMECO database. To 
sum up, the dependent variable is as follows:  
 
1 − ∆ − ∆ − ∆ t t NorR t E TW α  
 
where ∆TWtNorR is the change in total (nominal or real) wages in time t; ∆Et is the  
change in employment in time t; ∆αt-1 is lagged total factor productivity growth.  
All in all, this measure of wage growth differs from the so-called real wage gap 
indicator, i.e. real compensation per employee expressed in labour efficiency units 
(Blanchard 1997) insofar as it looks at nominal total compensations. But it is also 
different from unit labour costs to the extent that productivity is here lagged. 
 
Table 1 presents figures on the nominal and the real version of the dependent variable. 
Wage discipline rises in decreasing values of the dependent variable. Average 
nominal wages have gone up, albeit only slightly, after the introduction of the single 
currency. In the euro-zone, they grew by 0.79% from the average in the previous 
period (1994-1999). In real terms, wage growth remained de facto unchanged. These 
figures are consistent with the view that EMU has not weakened the incentive behind 
wage moderation. In fact, the period before the introduction of the Euro was 
characterised by extraordinary wage restraint agreed in the framework of social pacts, 
as EU countries were under the pressure to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria 
and qualify for EMU membership. Most interestingly, the figures are in line with the 
                                                 
9 There is the risk that employment growth is determined endogenously by the size of the national 
labour market, if it were true that large labour markets tend to attract more workers than smaller ones. 
This is but not confirmed by statistical evidence. The correlation between the size of employment in 
1999 in 10 EMU countries and the percentage increase of employment over the 1999-2005 period 
yields the following equation y = -1.0828Ln(x) + 10.175 with a R
2 of 0.05, which confirms that there is 
no significant relationship between the initial size of a national labour market and its growth rate.    13
general working hypothesis behind this paper, namely that the ECB’s monetary policy 
may be exercising a disciplining effect on national wage-setters. Nominal and real 
wage growth in non euro-zone countries (Denmark, Sweden, UK) was faster under 
EMU than in the pre-EMU period, having in fact risen by 1.39% and 1.67% 
respectively from the previous period (1994-1999). Finally, the available data suggest 
that wage moderation is indeed a generalised phenomenon, but hat there is still 
significant cross-country variation, as already highlighted elsewhere (European 
Commission 2007), which I explain as being a function of country size, amongst other 
things. 
 
TABLE 1. AVERAGE WAGE GROWTH BEFORE (1994-99) AND AFTER 
EMU (2000-05) 
  1994-99  2000-05  Difference 
(2000-05) – (1994-99) 
  Nominal Real Nominal Real  Nominal  Real 
Belgium  0.99 -0.03 2.65 0.12 1.66  0.15 
Denmark  2.38 0.92 2.19 0.25 -0.19  -0.67 
Germany  1.05 1.08 1.19 0.55 0.14  -0.53 
Spain  1.7 0.92  1.92  -1.79 0.22  -2.71 
France  2.17 0.18 2.15 0.55 -0.02  0.37 
Italy  2.24 0.18 2.03 -0.89 -0.21  -1.07 
Netherlands  0.10 -1.42  2.745 0.65 2.645  2.07 
Austria   1.45 1.3 1.87  0.39 0.42  -0.91 
Portugal  2.31 0.28 1.95 -0.58 -0.36  -0.86 
Finland  -0.48 -2.97 2.11 0.89  2.59  3.86 
Sweden  1.56 0.06 2.71 1.98 1.15  1.92 
United Kingdom  -0.71 -4.35  2.5  -0.58 3.21  3.77 
Average for euro countries      0.79  0.04 
Average for non-euro countries      1.39  1.67 
Source: own elaboration on data from AMECO Database 
 
In order to substantiate my argument, I provide for a statistical estimate of the 
correlation between wage growth and country size. The sample comprises 9 euro-zone 
members (Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, 
Portugal, Finland). Greece has been left out because it entered the monetary union 
only in 2002, and provides thus only a limited number of observations. I also 
excluded Luxembourg and Ireland, the former because too small and differently 
structured than the other member economies, and the latter both because it witnessed 
an extraordinary transformation on labour markets during the 1990s –as a catching-up 
country- and because of the lack of qualitative indicators on national labour market 
institutions. Country size is measured in terms of total employment. This seems a 
better measure than GDP levels considering that, in a possible signalling game 
between the ECB and national wage-setters, the size of the labour market is more 
relevant than a general measure of the country’s economic strength. The choice of this 
measure has important implications for the categorization of countries according to 
size. In fact, German GDP is about one third greater than that of France, Italy and 
Spain, but the size of its labour market is double that of the other large euro-area 
countries. Table 2 is a case summary. 
   14
TABLE 2. CASE SUMMARIES  
Belgium  ,010 ,027 ,000 ,001 3939,980 4035,446 232,232 264,045 
Germany  ,011 ,012 ,011 ,006 37671,830 38175,789 1895,696 2083,835 
Spain  ,017 ,019 ,009 -,018 14249,450 15533,323 539,002 674,442 
France  ,022 ,022 ,002 ,006 22958,480 23658,839 1305,677 1511,013 
Italy  ,022 ,020 ,002 -,009 21698,130 22548,436 1091,544 1208,784 
NL  ,001 ,027 -,014 ,006 7426,220 7676,168 366,886 435,805 
Austria  ,014 ,019 ,013 ,004 3973,450 4035,877 186,839 213,769 
Portugal  ,023 ,020 ,003 -,006 4628,680 4775,386 105,389 122,630 
Finland  -,005 ,021 -,030 ,009 2127,700 2217,053 109,816 139,988 
-,005 ,012 -,030 -,018 2127,700 2217,053 105,389 122,630 
,023 ,027 ,013 ,009 37671,830 38175,789 1895,696 2083,835 































.   The curve estimation for nominal wage growth and country size is not significant in the 
period preceding the introduction of the single currency, neither the linear nor the quadratic 
function (Table 3). This result should be taken to suggest that, from 1994 to 1999, there is 
no relationship whatsoever between wage growth and country size. Instead, the correlation 
becomes robust under the EMU regime. Table 2 indicates that over 55% of the variation in 
wage growth is explained by the square of country size, a result that confirms the 
hypothesised non-linear relationship between these two variables. Linearity is significant 
too but it accounts for a more modest 40% of the variation in total wage growth. 
Reinforcing the view that EMU membership is responsible for this non-monotonic 
correlation between wage growth and country size is the fact that, once three non euro-zone 
members are included in the sample (i.e. Denmark, Sweden and United Kingdom), the 
results are still significant but the adjusted R-square of the quadratic function is a more 
modest 0.42 against the 0.55 registered for EMU countries only
10.  
 
TABLE 3. NOMINAL WAGE GROWTH AND COUNTRY SIZE: CURVE 
ESTIMATION 
  1994-1999 2000-2005 
NOM. WAGE 
GROWTH 
    
 
 Linear  Quadratic  Linear 
Quadratic 
Sig. ,397  ,256  ,066*  ,089* 
(Constant) ,937  ,198  2,388  2,128 
Adjusted R-
Square 
,104 ,365 ,403 ,553 
Key = * significant at the 5% to 10% level; ** significant at the 1% to 4% level.  
 
Interestingly enough, there is no significant statistical relationship between real wage 
growth and country size, neither linear nor quadratic, and this throughout the period from 
1994 to 2005 (Table 4).  
 
TABLE 4. REAL WAGE GROWTH AND COUNTRY SIZE: CURVE 
ESTIMATION 
  1994-1999 2000-2005 
REAL WAGE 
GROWTH 
     
 Linear  Quadratic  Linear  Quadratic 
Sig.   ,235  ,497  ,858  ,288 
(Constant) -,704  -,938  ,056  ,818 
Adjusted R-
Square 
,194 ,208 ,005  ,340 
Key = * significant at the 5% to 10% level; ** significant at the 1% to 4% level. 
                                                 
10 It should be further noted that the relationship is not statistically significant when country size is measured 
in terms of gross national income at 2000 prices.    16
 
That nominal wage growth is significant but real wage growth is not is a theoretically 
interesting result insofar as it confirms, firstly, the Keynesian view that unions tend to 
bargain over nominal wages and, secondly, that monetary policy may indeed have an 
impact on wage growth, an argument that is at the root of this paper. It is interesting to note 
that this is exactly the aggregate the ECB seems mostly responsive to:  
 
“The extent to which an increase in nominal wage growth leads to upward pressure on 
inflation depends crucially on trend labour productivity growth. Under normal 
circumstances, stronger labour productivity growth would justify an increase in nominal 
wage growth, thus allowing wage earners to participate in economic growth without adding 
to inflationary pressures. But for the same reason, without sustained improvements in 
labour productivity higher nominal wages would not lead to improvements in real 
purchasing power, but fuel inflationary pressures (Trichet 2007)”. 
 
Graph 1 is a representation of the correlation between nominal wage moderation and 


















Graph 1. The hump-shaped relationship between wage 
growth and country size (2000-2005)  17
4. AN ECONOMETRIC EXERCISE BASED ON AVERAGES  
 
 
To test the argument hypothesised above, I estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions, for the pre-EMU and post-EMU period, of the following form: 
 
 
ε β β β β + + + + = ∆ IntraEMU Density SizeQuad S W 4 3 2 1  
 
where ∆W, the dependent variable, is the average percentage change in nominal wages 
minus productivity in t-1 minus employment growth, which will be calculated for the 
period before and after the introduction of the single currency; S is the average size of each 
country measured in terms of total employment; Size Quad is the square of size; openness 
is the average contribution of trade to GDP formation; Density is the portion of employees 
who are union members and is used as a proxy for coordination; Intra-EMU trade is the 
percentage of exports towards other EMU countries over total exports
11. 
 
I do not expect the first variable S it to be significant under EMU as the relationship 
between wage growth and size should be non-monotonic. Instead, the square of size should 
be statistically significant and bear a negative sign to confirm the hump-shaped wage-size 
relationship. The variable about density looks at the role of labour market institutions in 
wage formation processes. 
 
Table 5 presents the results from the OLS regression for the period from 1994 to 1999 and 
from 2000 to 2005 for euro-area countries only. Model 1 for both the pre-EMU and the 
post-EMU period estimates the relationship between nominal growth, country size and the 
square of size. The results confirm the existence of a link between wage developments and 
the size of the labour market. In particular, the hump-shaped pattern is well manifest in 
both periods but more significant under EMU than before the introduction of the single 
currency with a p-value of 0.15 against 0.29 in 1994-1999. Moreover, the hump is more 
pronounced in 2000-2005 than in the previous period with a negative coefficient of 7.1 
against 4.5. Throughout the period from 1994 to 2006, country size explains about 70% of 
the variation in nominal wage growth, whether in a monotonic or non-monotonic fashion. 
 
Model 2 adds labour market institutions. The variable for density is significant under EMU 
and not in 1994-1999. Dissimilarly to Posen and Gould (2006), who find that monetary 
credibility has an impact on wage developments independently of the structure of labour 
markets, these results confirm my working hypothesis, for which the non-accommodating 
stance of the ECB should bite and force unions in large countries into delivering wage 
restraint only in highly centralised bargaining system. The sign of the estimated coefficient 
                                                 
11 I have left cyclical variables out of the picture in light of the fact that the recent literature has been stressing 
the lack of a strong link between cyclical positions and wage developments. If they do, then the elasticity of 
wages to unemployment is of about 30% (Arpaia and Pichelmann 2007), which is probably but not sufficient 
to flatten the hump in the curve.    18
is but opposite from the one expected. Nevertheless, this outcome may depend upon the 
limited number of observations and the modest size of the sample is also not allowing a 
further test on this hypothesis, which would require adding an interaction term to check 
whether it is true that wage growth and coordination in collective bargaining are negatively 
correlated in large countries, yet not necessarily so in small economies. 
 
Model 3 includes also the lever of intra-EMU trade. Interestingly enough, the variable is 
significant only under EMU even if it does not bear the expected sign. Again, this result 
should be treated with caution as it is likely to depend upon the limited number of 
observations.  
 
TABLE 5. OLS ESTIMATIONS: BASIC DETERMINANTS OF NOMINAL WAGE 
GROWTH BEFORE AND AFTER EMU 
 1994-1999  2000-2005 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (1) (2) (3) 




































    
Adjusted R-Square  0.718 0.672 0.680 0.707 0.916 0.974 
Number of observations  99 999  9  
Key = * significant at the 5% to 10% level; ** significant at the 1% to 4% level; all other estimates 
are significant at the 1% level. b = significance of 0.106. 
 
 
Whatever the model adopted and in spite of the very limited number of observations, the 
important result that emerges from Table 4 is that the hypothesised non-monotonic 
relationship between wage growth and country size is robust. Whilst wage moderation is a 
fairly generalised phenomenon in EMU, large, intermediate and small countries have 
different motivations for restraint. In large countries, excessive wage settlements are 
particularly detrimental to employment under the new monetary regime. Since wage and 
price developments in large countries can potentially affect average inflation in the euro-
area, lack of moderation is likely to produce a restrictive monetary response by the ECB. 
An interest rate hike would not only dampen aggregate demand at home, but also in the rest 
of the euro-zone and thereby affect large countries’ exports towards the other monetary 
union members. Small countries have an incentive to deliver wage moderation as well, yet, 
this will be less pronounced than in the case of larger EMU countries. With respect to the 
monetary policy regime, small countries are free riders. Nevertheless, they will control 
wage inflation and, with it, the real exchange rate so as to preserve their international 
competitiveness considering that all small countries are also extremely open economies.   19
This latter motive is but less compelling that the one dominating in larger countries. As a 
matter of fact, the deterioration in cost competitiveness has only an uncertain impact on a 
country’s export performance (Carlin et al 2001), if not because countries hardly produce 
perfect substitutes, but the dampening effect of a monetary restriction on demand abroad is 
certain. Finally, in countries of intermediate size, the impact of national wage and price 
developments on average inflation in the euro-zone is ambiguous and competitiveness 




5. TESTING ROBUSTNESS WITH PANEL DATA ANALYSIS 
 
So as to check the robustness of my previous results, I use here panel data to estimate the 
effects of a few key independent variables on nominal wage growth. The analysis relies on 
a linear regression with panel-corrected standard errors and a panel-specific form of 
autocorrelation based on Durbin-Watson. The overall econometric model is of the 
following form: 
 
ε β β β β β β + + + + + + = ∆ IntraEMU Openness Density BIG INTERM SMALL W 6 5 4 3 2 1 .  
 
where  SMALL,  INTERM.,  BIG  are three dummy variables to represent country size; these 
dummies have been created to account for the fact that the size-variable is completely 
discrete. Density is the portion of employees who are union members; as highlighted above, 
this is not an ideal measure for LMI in this specific research context, but it is the only 
labour market indicator for which it is possible to extrapolate yearly values and is used here 
as a proxy for coordination. Openness is the yearly contribution of trade to GDP formation. 
Intra-EMU is the share of total exports directed to other euro-zone countries.  
 
The estimation results for the period from 1994 to 2005 are presented in Table 6. Column 1 
displays the results from a base specification that tests the relationship between wage 
growth and country size, whilst not controlling for any other variable.  
The estimated coefficients on the three dummy variables (SMALL, INTERM. and BIG) are 
all significant at a level between 0% and 1% (p-values are 0.003, 0.000, and 0.018 
respectively). Most interestingly, these estimates form a hump-shaped pattern as they rise 
from a value of 1.57 to 2.05 and then decrease down to 1.12 for big countries, reinforcing 
our assumption that wage growth is slower-than-average in small countries, yet, not as 
much as in large countries. These results are fairly robust considering that they are 
insensitive to the model used
12. It should be noted, however, that the German case is 
unequivocally driving the results. As a matter of fact, when including three other EU 
countries that are not part of the euro-area (Denmark, Sweden and UK), the dummy for big 
countries -which includes not only Germany but also the UK- looses its significance. This 
is in line with the general argument of the paper, for which the hump-shaped relationship 
                                                 
12 Only in model (3) “SMALL” looses some of its statistical significance.   20
between wage growth and country size is a prerogative of euro-area members, as well as 
with its strong empirical approach as in fact Germany is the only EMU country that could 
possibly condition the reaction function of the ECB, given its size, the structure of its 
labour market institutions and unions’ familiarity with a setting of strategic interaction with 
monetary authorities (Soskice 1990; Hall 1994).  
 
Model 2 adds density to the three dummy variables. The estimated coefficients on the 
variables for size are all highly significant with p-values of 0.000. Moreover, they confirm 
the hump-shaped pattern already revealed in model 1. Density is equally significant (p-
value  of 0.000) and the sign of the coefficient confirms the Calmfors’ and Driffil’s 
hypothesis, for which higher levels of coordination are associated with greater wage 
restraint because encompassing unions tend to internalise the negative externalities from 
excessive wage settlements in the presence of a non-accommodating monetary authority.  
 
Finally, model 3 incorporates two additional independent variables: openness and intra-
EMU trade. The estimated coefficients on the three dummy variables SMALL, INTERM. 
and BIG are by and large significant, even if to different degrees (p-values are 0.112, 0.015, 
and 0.085 respectively) and confirm the non-monotonic relationship between nominal wage 
growth and country size. Density is also highly significant (p-value of 0.012) and confirms 
its negative sign. Openness is significant and positively correlated with wage growth, 
thereby suggesting, in contrast with Romer (1993), that wage inflation is greater in more 
open economies. There are two possible explanations for this awkward result: either is freer 
trade a driver of labour market conditions and thus of wage growth (see OECD 2005) or 
labour unions in open economies are less wary of their wage behaviour considering that a 
large portion of the domestic price level is determined abroad (Daniels et al 2006). Intra-
EMU is significant even if to a lesser extent than openness (p-value of 0.062 against 0.002 
for openness) arguably because the sample includes the entire 1994-2005 period, whilst the 
working hypothesis behind the present exercise is that trade within the euro-area becomes a 
crucial variable only under EMU. Nevertheless, the sign is as expected suggesting that 
wage growth is modest especially in those countries that entertain dense trade relations with 
other EMU countries not least because a monetary restrictions would dampen demand 
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TABLE 6. PANEL DATA: BASIC DETERMINANTS OF NOMINAL WAGE 
GROWTH, 1994-2005 
 1994-2005 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 






















Openness     0.03 
(0.01)** 
Intra-EMU     -0.05 
(0.03)* 
     
R-Square  0.37 0.38 0.48 
Number of observations  108 96  90 
         Panel-corrected standard errors in parenthesis; key = * significant  
at the 5% to 10% level; ** significant at the 1% to 4% level;  
a = the p-value for small is only slightly above the 10% level (0.112) 
 
 
The results in table 5 refer to the entire period from 1994 to 2005. To better gauge  
the EMU effect, I have then conducted two separate estimates, one for the period 1994-
1999, and one for 2000-2005. Constrained by the modest number of observations, I have 
left the dummies for size out in order to focus on the interaction terms that should be 
revealing of the two basic assumptions behind this paper. The new estimation model is as 
follows:  
 
ε β β β β β + + + + + = ∆ Density Size IntraEMU Size IntraEMU Openness Density W * * 5 4 3 2 1  
 
where Size*Intra-EMU trade is an interaction terms that links size and intra-EMU trade to 
test whether large countries are more wary of wage developments when they entertain 
intense trade relations with the rest of the euro-zone; Size*Density is again an interaction 
term, which aims to assess where country size matters only in rising union density.  
 
The estimation results are presented in table 7. Model 1 focuses on the interaction between 
country size and size of intra-EMU trade. The results are fairly awkward in this case. Both 
openness and intra-EMU show to be significant variables throughout the period. The 
interaction term size * intra-EMU is not significant, but it is nonetheless worth noting the 
variable has a better significance value under EMU than earlier and that it assumes the 
expected value in 2000-2005. 
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In Model 2, I substitute size * intra-EMU with size * density. Here, density and openness 
confirm significant in the determination of wage developments. In line with my initial 
hypothesis, the interaction between country size and collective bargaining systems is not 
significant in 1994-1999 but becomes very significant after the introduction of the single 
currency. This is there to suggest and confirm that, under the EMU regime, wages decrease 
in rising size and more so where a larger share of the labour force is unionised, which in 
this instance can be used as a proxy for coordination.  
 
TABLE 7. PANEL DATA: BASIC DETERMINANTS OF NOMIMAL  WAGE 










































   
Adjusted R-Square  0.16 0.69 0.16 0.70
Number of observations  41 41 41 41
Panel-corrected standard errors in parenthesis  






The results herewith achieved have far-reaching implications. First, from a theoretical 
perspective, it seems relevant that unions tend to bargain over nominal rather than real 
wages. Models that support the argument that union behaviour is pivotal to the 
determination of equilibrium unemployment imply that labour unions, whether monopoly 
or atomistic, bargain over real wages and thus care for inflation only insofar as this 
determines their real wage. Nevertheless, it is probably realistic to assume that, at relatively 
low levels of inflation, which is a feature of the EMU regime, unions are less sensitive to 
inflation per se, whilst but wary of the real impact of monetary policy. They thus refrain 
from excessive nominal wage settlements as these would precipitate a reaction by the most 
inflation-avert actor of the economic system, i.e. the ECB. A monetary restriction would in 
fact produce more unemployment leading to a fall in the bargained real wage. Second, the 
present research results imply that the EMU regime is far from being an unconditional 
blessing. A one-size-fits-all monetary policy comes in fact with significant distributional 
consequences depending on country size. The largest EU labour market, Germany, is   23
constrained in a straight-jacket. German wage bargainers have been refraining from 
excessive nominal wage settlements as their behaviour has the potential to affect average 
price conditions in the euro-zone and to induce the ECB to react with an interest rate hike. 
As the latter would concern the euro-area as a whole, the costs are diffused across 
categories, involving simultaneously national consumers, investors, and export-oriented 
sectors. Certainly, slow economic growth has contributed itself to moderate wage 
developments in Germany. Yet, whilst the EMU regime and output fluctuations have been 
pushing wage growth in the same direction, greater risks lie ahead now that German 
economic growth is moving back towards the upper side of the cycle. In the boom, national 
wage bargainers will be induced to share rents with employers, but they will nonetheless 
remain subject to the constraint of the EMU regime and the fear that the ECB punishes 
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Expected sign  Comments  
Product market 
competition 
Wn; Wr; Wn – α;  
Wr – α 






Negative  It concerns the EU as 
a whole 
Openness Wn; Wr; Wn – α;  
Wr – α 
Negative  It concerns the EU as 
a whole, but it should 
be stronger in EMU 
Labour market 
institutions 
Wn; Wr  Negative   It concerns the EU as 
a whole 
Size   Wn; Wr; Wn – α;  
Wr – α 
Non-linear It  concerns  EMU 
only 
Intra-EMU trade   Wn; Wr; Wn – α;  
Wr – α 
Non-linear It  concerns  EMU 
only 
 
Key: Wn = nominal wage; Wr = real wage; Wn – α = nominal wage growth minus productivity; Wr 
– α = real wage growth minus productivity. 
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